H.R. 1294 passed in the House of Representatives this week. A small victory for the Virginia Indian Tribes and now the next stop will be the Senate where a discussion among the members of the Senate Indian Affairs committee will determine the next victory. The Democratic Party now controls the majority in the 11oth Congress and new possibilities exist with this change in power. Also the shift in chairman of the Senate Indians Affairs committee brings a different perspective.
The new chairman is U.S. Senator Byron Dorgan. Dorgan said he will work closely with the committee’s vice chairman, Senator Craig Thomas, to ensure it continues to operate in its traditional bipartisan fashion. Dorgan said he is hopeful that the committee will address the most critical issues that face American Indian communities.” I believe there is a bona fide crisis in Indian health care, education and housing, and this committee has an opportunity to make a real difference on those issues during this Congress,” Dorgan said. “I look forward to charting a course that will help move our American Indian communities forward.”
I wrote to Senator Dorgan to congratulate him on his appointment and quiz him about his awareness of Virginia Indian Tribes attempt to gain federal sovereignty. To date I have received no response.
Even if the both houses pass the bill the President must sign the bill to become effective.
I am concerned about the current political climate between to the two branches and threats of veto power surrounding IRAQ. I have emailed "White House Interactive Page" quizzing them on the President's position on this bill. I am not sure why its titled "interactive" their lastest posting is dated March 26, 2007 | 10:57 a.m.(EDT) and others date back to 2005. Native Americans is not on the list of topics on this website.
With Jamestown 2007 Celebration under way it will be interesting to see how fast this bill is placed on the agenda of the Senate Indians Affairs Committee.
Friday, May 11, 2007
Friday, April 27, 2007
Virginia Tech
These are dark days for Virginia Tech, but the light of students shines bright in the world as their purpose becomes more clear. I have spoken to several students who remain strong in spirit. The HOKIE Nation's numbers are many all over the world and all shine their lights in these dark days to support those affected by this tragic event.Messages such as, "Today we are all hokies" has shown the support from every corner of the globe. In the wake of bad things the good in all people come to light.
Tuesday, April 24, 2007
Political Status
American Indians as Political Status
The United States recognizes Indian tribes as political entities with regards to Indian law and policy based on the political status of Indian tribes. Indian law is not based on a constitutional race law paradigm.
Morton v. Mancari – footnote 24 describes the federal legislation and rules relating to Indian tribes as a political classification. The implementation of the rule of Johnson v. M’Intosh, Indian treaties, and Acts of the First Congress offers significant evidence that the original understanding of the Founders was that Indian tribes and the federal government enjoy a political relationship, not racial.
Legal opinions of Justice Blackmun,[1] Justice Stevens,[2] and Judge Kozinski,[3] have been among the federal and state court judges confronted with the question of whether Indian law is a question of race law or politics. It is a rare occasion when federal courts are presented with the argument that statutes and regulations that create, for example, federal program preferences for Indian tribes or individual Indians are unconstitutional under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments,[4] Title 25 of the United States Code[5] relates to Indian Law. This area of Constitutional and Indian law is superficially theorized using judicial authority.
The First Congress’s statement of Indian policy in the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act[6] is the first major Indian law decision from the Supreme Court, Johnson v. M’Intosh.[7] Johnson. It constitutionalized the rule that only the federal government could clear title to Indian land – or in the Court’s phrasing, “an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.”[8] Congress had already exercised its Indian Commerce Clause[9] power to ban the states from purchasing or acquiring Indian lands in the Trade and Intercourse Act.[10]
Indian law’s general perception is one of the race law paradigm created by the Constitution and recreated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun’s footnote in Morton v. Mancari, describes federal legislation related to Indian tribes as a political classification[11] but offered insufficient guidance for lower courts.
American Indian law and policy can be researched back to the Johnson v. M’Intosh [12] and the Fourteenth Amendment and the treatment of Indian people under both the political and racial classifications. The rule of Johnson v. M’Intosh offers significant proof of this political relationship.
In order for Indian Law to be judged as race law they would be governed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The main focus is that overwhelming political, legal, and historical evidence that the foundations of American Indian law are political, not racial.
While federal Indian law and policy has been on a track parallel to race law and appears to retain many of the same elements, courts and commentators misunderstand this relationship. As a result, they attempt to place Indian law into a cubbyhole in which it doesn’t fit – race law. As a result, courts and commentators continue to discuss whether certain statutes that apply only to American Indians should be analyzed under the rubric of Caroline Products’ footnote 4,[13] debating whether or not to apply strict scrutiny.
Next time, How International law can be used to view racial discrimination regarding the Virginia Indian tribe’s journey for sovereignty.
[1] Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 (1974) (“Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”) (citing Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814 n. 13 (E.D. Wash. 1965), aff’d, 384 U.S. 209 (1966)).
[2] Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 244-45 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We should reject a concept of ‘consistency’ that would view the special preferences that the National Government has provided to Native Americans since 1834 as comparable to the official discrimination against African-Americans that was prevalent for much of our history.”) (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541).
[3] Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (“If Justice Stevens is right about the logical implications of Adarand, Mancari’s days are numbered.”) (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-27, 244; Mancari, 415 U.S. 535; Stuart Major Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of the Native Hawaiians, 106 Yale L. J. 537, 567 (1996)).
[4] E.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (Fifth Amendment); Flynt v. California Gambling Control Commission, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157 (Cal. App. 2002) (Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (Thirteenth Amendment).
[5] See, e.g., Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552-53.
[6] Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
[7] 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
[8] Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
[9] Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
[10] See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution, A Biography 108 n. (2005).
[11] Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n. 24 (1974) (“The preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”).
[12] 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
[13] United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
The United States recognizes Indian tribes as political entities with regards to Indian law and policy based on the political status of Indian tribes. Indian law is not based on a constitutional race law paradigm.
Morton v. Mancari – footnote 24 describes the federal legislation and rules relating to Indian tribes as a political classification. The implementation of the rule of Johnson v. M’Intosh, Indian treaties, and Acts of the First Congress offers significant evidence that the original understanding of the Founders was that Indian tribes and the federal government enjoy a political relationship, not racial.
Legal opinions of Justice Blackmun,[1] Justice Stevens,[2] and Judge Kozinski,[3] have been among the federal and state court judges confronted with the question of whether Indian law is a question of race law or politics. It is a rare occasion when federal courts are presented with the argument that statutes and regulations that create, for example, federal program preferences for Indian tribes or individual Indians are unconstitutional under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments,[4] Title 25 of the United States Code[5] relates to Indian Law. This area of Constitutional and Indian law is superficially theorized using judicial authority.
The First Congress’s statement of Indian policy in the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act[6] is the first major Indian law decision from the Supreme Court, Johnson v. M’Intosh.[7] Johnson. It constitutionalized the rule that only the federal government could clear title to Indian land – or in the Court’s phrasing, “an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.”[8] Congress had already exercised its Indian Commerce Clause[9] power to ban the states from purchasing or acquiring Indian lands in the Trade and Intercourse Act.[10]
Indian law’s general perception is one of the race law paradigm created by the Constitution and recreated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun’s footnote in Morton v. Mancari, describes federal legislation related to Indian tribes as a political classification[11] but offered insufficient guidance for lower courts.
American Indian law and policy can be researched back to the Johnson v. M’Intosh [12] and the Fourteenth Amendment and the treatment of Indian people under both the political and racial classifications. The rule of Johnson v. M’Intosh offers significant proof of this political relationship.
In order for Indian Law to be judged as race law they would be governed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The main focus is that overwhelming political, legal, and historical evidence that the foundations of American Indian law are political, not racial.
While federal Indian law and policy has been on a track parallel to race law and appears to retain many of the same elements, courts and commentators misunderstand this relationship. As a result, they attempt to place Indian law into a cubbyhole in which it doesn’t fit – race law. As a result, courts and commentators continue to discuss whether certain statutes that apply only to American Indians should be analyzed under the rubric of Caroline Products’ footnote 4,[13] debating whether or not to apply strict scrutiny.
Next time, How International law can be used to view racial discrimination regarding the Virginia Indian tribe’s journey for sovereignty.
[1] Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 (1974) (“Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”) (citing Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814 n. 13 (E.D. Wash. 1965), aff’d, 384 U.S. 209 (1966)).
[2] Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 244-45 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We should reject a concept of ‘consistency’ that would view the special preferences that the National Government has provided to Native Americans since 1834 as comparable to the official discrimination against African-Americans that was prevalent for much of our history.”) (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541).
[3] Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (“If Justice Stevens is right about the logical implications of Adarand, Mancari’s days are numbered.”) (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-27, 244; Mancari, 415 U.S. 535; Stuart Major Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of the Native Hawaiians, 106 Yale L. J. 537, 567 (1996)).
[4] E.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (Fifth Amendment); Flynt v. California Gambling Control Commission, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157 (Cal. App. 2002) (Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (Thirteenth Amendment).
[5] See, e.g., Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552-53.
[6] Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
[7] 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
[8] Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
[9] Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
[10] See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution, A Biography 108 n. (2005).
[11] Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n. 24 (1974) (“The preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”).
[12] 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
[13] United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Acknowledgement Process
Acknowledgment Process under invesitgation
The Secretary of the Interior has delegated authority to make acknowledgment decisions to the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs.
Two months after the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation received federal recognition in 2004, then-Interior Department Secretary Gale Norton attended a meeting where she was told to reverse the tribe's federal status, court documents have revealed. Norton's and Cason were questioned under oath by the tribe's attorneys.
Cason said that he based the recognition reversal ''entirely on the recommendation and advice of OFA Director, Lee Fleming,'' given at a meeting held on Oct. 5, 2005. Schaghticoke decision would set a BIA precedent and be of historic importance.
The General Accounting Office was tasked with auditing the dysfunctional recognition process of the BIA. In November of 2001 the General Accounting Office evaluated the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) tribal recognition process.
Findings delineate a process that is subject to manipulation and abuse. Basis for BIA is tribal recognition decisions is not always clear. No clear guidance to explain how to interpret key aspects of the criteria. Level of evidence for sufficiency to prove tribes continuous existence over a period resulting in less regulatory certainty about the basis for recognition decisions. This is a main concern of the Virginia Tribes.
THIS MESSAGE IS POSTED ON THE BIA WEBSITE:
The BIA website as well as the BIA mail servers have been made temporarily unavailable due to the Cobell Litigation. Please continue to check from time to time. We have no estimate on when authorization will be given to reactivate these sites.
The Secretary of the Interior has delegated authority to make acknowledgment decisions to the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs.
Two months after the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation received federal recognition in 2004, then-Interior Department Secretary Gale Norton attended a meeting where she was told to reverse the tribe's federal status, court documents have revealed. Norton's and Cason were questioned under oath by the tribe's attorneys.
Cason said that he based the recognition reversal ''entirely on the recommendation and advice of OFA Director, Lee Fleming,'' given at a meeting held on Oct. 5, 2005. Schaghticoke decision would set a BIA precedent and be of historic importance.
The General Accounting Office was tasked with auditing the dysfunctional recognition process of the BIA. In November of 2001 the General Accounting Office evaluated the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) tribal recognition process.
Findings delineate a process that is subject to manipulation and abuse. Basis for BIA is tribal recognition decisions is not always clear. No clear guidance to explain how to interpret key aspects of the criteria. Level of evidence for sufficiency to prove tribes continuous existence over a period resulting in less regulatory certainty about the basis for recognition decisions. This is a main concern of the Virginia Tribes.
THIS MESSAGE IS POSTED ON THE BIA WEBSITE:
The BIA website as well as the BIA mail servers have been made temporarily unavailable due to the Cobell Litigation. Please continue to check from time to time. We have no estimate on when authorization will be given to reactivate these sites.
Friday, March 9, 2007
110th session of Congress
Rep. James P. Moran, D-Va., plans to introduce a bill that will grant the tribes - the Nansemond, Chickahominy, Eastern Chickahominy, Rappahannock and Upper Mattaponi, along with the Monacan Indian Nation - federal recognition as the 110th session of Congress gets under way, said Moran's press secretary, Austin Durrer.
On February 6, 2007 Moran introduced Senate Joint Resolution No. 333.
On February 6, 2007 Moran introduced Senate Joint Resolution No. 333.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
